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SPORTS MERCHANDISING, PUBLICITY 
RIGHTS, AND THE MISSING ROLE  
OF THE SPORTS FAN 
Joseph P. Liu* 
Abstract: Sports fans play a tremendously important role in the success 
and popularity of sports teams and the enterprise of sports in general. It 
is somewhat curious, then, that fan interests are almost entirely missing 
from discussions about certain important legal issues that have a direct 
impact on them. Specifically, fan interests play a surprisingly limited role 
in discussions about sports team merchandising and player rights of pub-
licity. This Article argues that modern sports licensing practices are com-
ing into increasing conflict with the interests of sports fans, and that the 
law should take greater account of such interests. This Article starts by 
discussing the relatively weak legal foundation upon which modern li-
censing practices are based. It then draws on the expanding literature on 
fan interests in the field of copyright to show how the foundation is even 
weaker in the context of sports. It concludes by arguing for far more lim-
ited recognition of the intellectual property rights of sports franchises, 
leagues, and players. 
Introduction 
 Sports fans play a tremendously important role in the success and 
popularity of sports teams and the enterprise of sports in general. In-
deed, if the teams and sports journalists are to be believed, the fans are 
what it is all about. When a local team wins a championship, the owners 
and players first thank the fans.1 Team owners and players all say that 
 
* © 2011, Joseph P. Liu, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Thanks to the 
participants at the Boston College Law School symposium “The NCAA at 100 Years: Per-
spectives on Its Past, Present, and Future” for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 See, e.g., Timothy McNulty & Kaitlynn Riely, Penguins Fans Cheer Stanley Cup Champions, 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 15, 2009, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09166/ 
977553-100.stm (quoting the Pittsburgh Penguins’ owner as saying to the fans, “You guys 
are part of our family. Thank you, Pittsburgh, enjoy it.”); Crush of Red: City Says 2 Million 
Fans Rally for Hawks, Chi. Breaking News ( June 11, 2010, 4:44 PM), http://www.chicago 
breakingnews.com/2010/06/no-rain-on-hawks-parade.html (quoting a Chicago Blackhawks 
star as saying, “You guys are the greatest. Thank you very much,” to a sea of fans at the 
team’s championship parade). 
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the fans motivate them to succeed.2 And it is hard to deny that fans are 
critical to the team’s economic success when they are the ones buying 
tickets to games, watching games on television, and spending money on 
merchandise.3 More than that, fans are unbelievably passionate about 
their teams, arguing constantly over tactics and desperately following 
the ups and downs of their teams.4 
 Given the crucial role played by fans, it is somewhat curious that 
fan interests are almost entirely missing from discussions about certain 
important legal issues that have a direct impact on fans. Specifically, fan 
interests play a surprisingly limited role in discussions about sports 
team merchandising and player rights of publicity.5 Over the years, 
sports teams and leagues have become increasingly aggressive in their 
licensing of team trademarks and players’ rights of publicity.6 Teams 
and leagues now derive substantial revenues from merchandising and 
other licensing rights.7 
 This Article argues that modern sports licensing practices are com-
ing into increasing conflict with the interests of sports fans, and that the 
                                                                                                                      
2 See, e.g., Scoop Jackson, Do Philadelphia Fans Deserve a World Championship?, ESPN (Oct. 
30, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=jackson/081030 (quoting 
the Philadelphia Phillies’ manager as saying, “This is for the fans!” after winning the World 
Series); Chris Merriewether, Player Thanks Wildcat Nation, Kan. St. Collegian (Kan. State 
Univ., Manhattan, Kan.), Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.kstatecollegian.com/sports/player-thanks-
wildcat-nation-1.2212564?MMode=true (letter from Kansas State basketball player to fans) 
(thanking the fans for multiple acts through the season and saying, “We could not have ac-
complished anything without you.”). 
3 See Wayne S. DeSarbo, Measuring Fan Avidity Can Help Marketers Narrow Their Focus, 
Street & Smith’s Sports Bus. J., Dec. 21, 2009, at 13, available at http://www.sportsbusiness 
journal.com/article/64438. 
4 See, e.g., Jeff Pearlman, Sports Fans Are Passionate, but Many Need a Dose of Perspective, 
SI.com (Aug. 6, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/jeff_pearlman/08/ 
06/angry.fans/index.html; 10/1: Majority of U.S. Residents College Football Fans . . . Nearly Half 
Watch NFL & College Ball, Marist Poll: Pebbles & Pundits (Oct. 1, 2010), http://marist 
poll.marist.edu/101-majority-of-u-s-residents-college-football-fans-%E2%80%A6-nearly- half- 
watch-nfl-college-ball/. 
5 See generally, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (court does not discuss fan interests); O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C 09-
1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (same); 
Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, “J.J. Morrison” and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 
15 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 241, 271–74 (no discussion of fan interests in right of publicity 
argument). 
6 See infra notes 23–41 and accompanying text. 
7 See Tim Lemke, SportsBiz: NCAA Merchandise Seeing Its Sales Fall Off, Wash. Times, Oct. 
15, 2009, at C6, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/15/sports 
biz-ncaa-merchandise-seeing-its-sales-fall-o/; Darren Rovell, Publication: MLB Will Beat NFL 
in Licensing Revenue in ’10, CNBC ( June 14, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/37692194/ 
Publication_MLB_Will_Beat_NFL_In_Licensing_Revenue_In_10. 
2011] Sports Fans, Sports Merchandising, and the Right of Publicity 495 
law should take such interests more into account. Part I discusses the 
increasing economic value of sports licensing and analyzes a number of 
recent disputes over intellectual property and licensing.8 Part II dis-
cusses the relatively weak legal foundation upon which modern licens-
ing practices are based.9 Part III then draws on the expanding litera-
ture on fan interests in the field of copyright to show how the 
foundation is even weaker in the context of sports.10 Part IV concludes 
by arguing that this analysis suggests a far more limited recognition of 
the intellectual property rights of sports franchises, leagues, and play-
ers.11 
utes that 
have arisen in the context of fantasy sports and video games.14 
ed States and Canada and approxi-
mately $17.5 billion worldwide.16 
                                                       
I. The Increasing Economic Value of Sports Licensing 
 Sports licensing is big business. This Part begins by examining the 
growing economic impact of sports licensing on professional and colle-
giate athletics.12 It then explores a number of recent disputes over in-
tellectual property rights in which teams have asserted claims that have 
gone beyond traditional merchandising and trademark claims.13 In par-
ticular, this Part takes a close look at a number of recent disp
A. Big Money 
 Professional sports leagues and franchises derive an increasingly 
large share of their revenues and profits from the licensing of trade-
marks, trade dress, and rights of publicity.15 Leagues and franchises sell 
all kinds of items—jerseys, caps, key chains, coffee mugs, posters, etc.— 
with their team logos on them, and their fans seem to have a near un-
limited desire to buy these items. In 2009, retail sales of licensed sports 
products from teams, leagues, and personalities amounted to approxi-
mately $12.5 billion in the Unit
                                                               
 
t. 
 accompanying text. 
censing, Fans, Press Box, http://www.pressbox 
 
8 See infra notes 15–41 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 42–82 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 83–140 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 141–161 and accompanying tex
12 See infra notes 15–22 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 23–39 and
14 See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text. 
15 See Rovell, supra note 7. 
16 Id. (listing last five years of licensing revenue for major sports leagues); see also Mi-
chael Freedman, NFL Still King in Sports Li
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 These trends have not been confined to professional sports. In-
deed, collegiate sports teams and leagues have also begun to more ag-
gressively license their trademarks and rights of publicity.17 Just as with 
professional sports teams, colleges and universities now place their lo-
gos and team colors on a wide range of merchandise for purchase by 
students and others. Merchandising generated more than $4 billion in 
revenue for colleges and universities in 2008.18 A successful season can 
increase the visibility of a team and, at the same time, generate substan-
tial added income from merchandising sales.19 
 As sports franchises and leagues have more aggressively licensed 
out their trademarks and rights of publicity, they have enforced their 
rights against companies and individuals who sell such items without 
permission.20 Franchises and leagues often sue vendors of unlicensed 
merchandise, claiming infringement of their trademark rights.21 Courts 
have generally upheld these efforts, finding that consumers may well be 
confused as to the source of these unauthorized goods.22 
B. Recent Disputes 
 Recently, however, sports franchises and leagues have begun to as-
sert more aggressive claims against third parties, targeting uses that go 
beyond traditional merchandising. One prominent recent example in-
volves fantasy sports leagues. Although fantasy sports leagues have been 
around for a long time, they have become increasingly popular over the 
                                                                                                                      
online.com/story.cfm?id=2247 (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (listing 2006 licensing revenue 
for major professional and college sports). 
17 See Lemke, supra note 7. 
18 Id. 
19 See Andy Hyland, Growth in Licensed Merchandise Increases KU Revenue, KUSports.com 
( July 27, 2009), http://www2.kusports.com/news/2009/jul/27/growth-licensed-merchan- 
dise-increases-KU-revenue/ (reporting that people spent thirty times more on licensed mer-
chandise after the men’s basketball team won the national championship in 2008 than they 
did ten years before that and explaining that the school gets a percentage of every item sold); 
see also Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 5, at 241–42 (noting that successful athletic institutions 
earn the largest share of licensed college merchandise royalties). 
20 See infra notes 21–41 and accompanying text. 
21 See, e.g., Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 73 
(5th Cir. 1979) (lawsuit brought by hockey league and member teams to enjoin manufac-
ture and sale of embroidered cloth emblems that were “substantial duplications of artistic 
symbols used to designate the individual member teams of the National Hockey League”); 
NBA v. Design Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 373, 373–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (law-
suit brought by NBA against company that allegedly violated preliminary injunction 
against “manufacturing, distributing, promoting or selling apparel products which bear 
NBA uniform designs or derivations or imitations thereof”). 
22 See, e.g., Boston Hockey, 597 F.2d at 75; Design Mgmt. Consultants, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
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past several years.23 Such leagues rely upon the statistics of actual sports 
figures from actual games, which league members use to determine how 
well their fantasy teams are doing.24 When fantasy sports leagues were 
largely managed informally by groups of friends, the franchises and 
leagues took little interest. 
 In recent years, however, Internet sites have arisen to make the 
management of such leagues much easier.25 This, in turn, has fueled an 
explosive growth in participation.26 These sites make prominent use of 
the names of actual sports teams and players, as well as statistics from 
actual games.27 In a number of cases, the real teams and leagues have 
asserted ownership over the trademarks and the statistics in lawsuits 
against these Internet websites.28 Courts have thus far rejected such 
claims as over-reaching.29 
 Disputes have also recently arisen over sports video games.30 Popu-
lar video games such as EA Sports’ Madden NFL make use of actual 
teams and include characters that represent actual players. Video game 
publishers such as EA Sports license the rights to the team names, team 
logos, team uniforms, and player identities from the sports leagues or 
players unions.31 The use of real teams and players in these games 
                                                                                                                      
23 See Michael Beller, For Fantasy Sports, Success Is the One Reality, Medill Rep., Feb. 24, 
2010, http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=158142. 
24 See id. 
25 See id.; Fantasy Sports Participation on the Rise, Association Says, St. Louis Bus. J., Aug. 
14, 2003, http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2003/08/11/daily62.html. 
26 See Beller, supra note 23; Fantasy Sports Participation on the Rise, supra note 25. 
27 See Beller, supra note 23. 
28 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 820–21 (8th Cir. 2007) (lawsuit over publicity rights in fantasy baseball); CBS 
Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398, 404 (D. Minn. 
2009) (lawsuit over publicity rights in fantasy football). See generally Manav K. Bhatnagar, 
Comment, Fantasy Liability: Publicity Law, the First Amendment, and Fantasy Sports, 119 Yale 
L.J. 131 (2009) (discussing C.B.C. Distribution and conflict between publicity law and fan-
tasy sports more generally). 
29 See C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 823 (ruling that fantasy baseball statistics are pro-
tected by the First Amendment); CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D. at 417–19 (applying C.B.C. 
Distribution to reach the same conclusion for fantasy football statistics); see also Gionfriddo 
v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 404, 414 (Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that 
“[b]aseball’s use of [former players’] names, images and likenesses” for programs, web-
sites, and written or video depictions of play did not violate players’ publicity rights). See 
generally Maureen C. Weston, The Fantasy of Athlete Publicity Rights: Public Fascination and 
Fantasy Sports’ Assertion of Free Use Place Athlete Publicity Rights on an Uncertain Playing Field, 11 
Chap. L. Rev. 581 (2008) (analyzing publicity rights in fantasy sports context after C.B.C. 
Distribution). 
30 See infra notes 130–138 and accompanying text. 
31 See Darren Rovell, All Madden, All the Time, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/ 
sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1945691 (last updated Dec. 14, 2004). 
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makes them highly desirable, as video game players can play as or 
against their favorite teams. There are, however, a number of ongoing 
disputes over the ability of these publishers to make use of player iden-
tities.32 In two separate cases that have since been consolidated, a num-
ber of former NCAA athletes have sued both EA Sports and the NCAA 
for allegedly using their identities in an unauthorized manner.33 
 In addition to these publicity right cases, teams and leagues have 
asserted ever more aggressive trademark claims.34 One recent example 
is University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art Inc., heard by the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in 2009.35 In 
that case, the University of Alabama brought a trademark infringement 
lawsuit against an artist who had painted scenes from famous moments 
in Alabama football history.36 The university claimed that the artist vio-
lated its trademark rights by depicting the colors and uniforms of its 
football team.37 The district court rejected the argument,38 but the case 
is now on appeal.39 
 Thus, in a number of cases, sports leagues, teams, and players have 
advanced ever more aggressive claims to be compensated for depictions 
of their trademarks, logos, trade dress, and rights of publicity.40 These 
                                                                                                                      
 
32 See infra notes 130–138 and accompanying text. See generally Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C 
09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); see also 
generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 
5644656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010) (consolidated title of Keller and O’Bannon cases). For a 
discussion of similar cases and issues, see generally Beth A. Cianfrone & Thomas A. Baker 
III, The Use of Student-Athlete Likenesses in Sport Video Games: An Application of the Right of Pub-
licity, 20 J. Legal Aspects Sport 35 (2010); Christian Dennie, Tebow Drops Back to Pass: 
Videogames Have Crossed the Line, but Does the Right of Publicity Protect a Student-Athlete’s Likeness 
When Balanced Against the First Amendment?, 62 Ark. L. Rev. 645 (2009). 
33 See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1–2; O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *1; see also L. Jon 
Wertheim, Again, A Potential Game Changer, Sports Illustrated Mag., Feb. 22, 2010, at 
19, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1166078/ 
index.htm; Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Antitrust 
Case, SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/michael_mccann/07/21/ 
ncaa/index.html (last updated July 22, 2009). 
34 See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
35 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
36 See id. at 1243–44. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. at 1259. 
39 See Jeffrey Sullivan, School Seeks to Protect Color Schemes in Sports Uniforms, Miami Daily 
Bus. R., Oct. 20, 2010, available at http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubArticleDBR.jsp 
?id=1202473564023&hbxlogin=. 
40 See, e.g., CBC Distribution, 505 F.3d at 820 (lawsuit over baseball players’ publicity 
rights); Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (former collegiate athlete brought right of publicity 
claim against video game manufacturer); New Life Art, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44 (university 
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cases involve claims that extend well beyond the traditional trademark 
rights that leagues and teams have historically enjoyed.41 
II. The Weak Justifications for Broad Licensing Rights 
 Despite the increasingly widespread nature of sports licensing, the 
intellectual property rights upon which such licensing is based find 
surprisingly little support in broader intellectual property policy.42 In-
deed, as many scholars have noted, the foundations for the merchan-
dising and publicity rights rest on relatively shaky ground.43 
A. Merchandising 
 To support their exclusive right to sell merchandised goods, sports 
teams and leagues rely upon trademark law. A sports team’s name and 
logo are clearly trademarks.44 Trademarks of all sorts are protected 
against uses that are likely to cause confusion among consumers.45 
Thus, if a third party sells unauthorized Boston Red Sox caps, for ex-
ample, consumers may be confused, thinking that the caps are being 
sold by the Red Sox. Standard trademark law would thus give the Red 
Sox a right to prevent the third party from selling such products.46 
 This straightforward theory runs into trouble, however, when the 
third parties make a concerted effort to notify the purchasers that these 
                                                                                                                      
brought trademark infringement claim against artist who painted famous moments in team’s 
football history). 
41 Compare New Life Art, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44 (non-traditional trademark in-
fringement claim against artist who painted famous moments in team’s football history), 
with Design Mgmt. Consultants, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 373–74 (traditional trademark infringe-
ment claim against company that manufactured, distributed, promoted, and sold apparel 
bearing logos identical or substantially similar to those of NBA teams). 
42 See supra notes 44–82 and accompanying text. 
43 See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile The-
ory or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461, 472–78 (2005) (noting the shaky foundations on 
which traditional merchandising rights lie); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public 
Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 178–238 (1993) (criticizing 
standard arguments for the right of publicity). 
44 The Lanham Act defines “trademark” to include “any word, name, symbol, or device 
. . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique 
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the 
goods . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
45 See Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 170 
(M.D.N.C. 1989) (stating that trademark infringement has been established if the plaintiff 
has “a protectable property right in the name or mark it seeks to defend” and “defendant’s 
use of a similar mark [is] likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception in the market as 
to source, origin, or sponsorship of the products on which the marks are used”). 
46 See id. 
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goods are not endorsed by the actual teams. For example, imagine that 
I sell unauthorized Red Sox caps, but have a prominent disclaimer say-
ing that these caps are not sold by the Red Sox nor endorsed by them 
in any way. Can I still sell them? Under traditional trademark law prin-
ciples, it would be hard to see why this should be harmful.47 Purchasers 
are on clear notice that the caps are not being made by the Red Sox, so 
they are not deceived.48 
 More broadly, an argument can be made that this kind of result in 
fact helps consumers more than it harms them.49 When a consumer 
buys an official Red Sox cap, he or she is paying a premium (and quite 
a large one at that) for the appearance of the Red Sox logo on that 
cap.50 Indeed, the logo itself is worth more than the material that the 
cap is made of. By introducing competition into this market, consum-
ers can get access to Red Sox caps from a variety of manufacturers. 
And, as long as the consumer knows who is responsible for manufactur-
ing the hat, he or she can choose to buy the higher-priced official ver-
sion or the lower-priced—perhaps more cheaply made—version.51 
 Even though the traditional consumer confusion theory of trade-
mark may not apply to this example, the newer dilution theory may 
provide a better fit. Under the dilution theory, trademarks are pro-
tected not only against uses that confuse consumers, but also against 
uses that dilute or blur the distinctive character of the mark.52 In the 
Red Sox example, once other companies use the Red Sox logo, con-
                                                                                                                      
47 See id. at 173 (finding no likelihood of confusion). In Board of Governors of the Univer-
sity of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, a 1989 case, the U.S. District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina noted that consumers of athletic apparel may not care who en-
dorses goods bearing their favorite teams’ names, stating that “it is equally likely that 
individuals buy the shirts to show their support for the University.” Id. 
48 See id. True, third parties who later see the caps might be confused. Some courts 
have recognized a cause of action in these circumstances under a theory of secondary or 
“post-sale” confusion. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-
Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955). Whether third parties are in 
fact confused depends, however, upon their expectations. If third parties had the right to 
make unlicensed baseball caps, consumer expectations would quickly change, reducing 
the potential for confusion. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 486–90. 
49 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 463–64. See generally Mark A. Kahn, May the Best 
Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-Trademark Uses of Sports Logos, 14 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 
283 (2004). 
50 See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of 
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 603, 604 (1984) (noting that some people are willing 
to pay more for products with logos on them). 
51 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 481. 
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (providing injunctive relief against uses that blur or 
dilute a trademark). 
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sumers will have to determine who is responsible for the particular use. 
Moreover, others could use the logo in a way that makes it less distinct, 
for example by using different colors or logo shapes. 
 Merchandising claims fare better under a dilution theory. Yet even 
in these cases, trademark law does not provide a neat fit.53 Traditional 
dilution theory applied to famous trademarks that were used on unre-
lated products—for example, Kodak bicycles or Buick aspirin.54 These 
uses were problematic because they weakened the distinctive character 
of the mark.55 If such uses were permitted, consumers would have to 
figure out whether Kodak referred to the film company or the bicycle 
company, even if there was no confusion. 
 The use by third parties in the sports cases, however, does not re-
semble this kind of use. The cap maker is not using the Red Sox logo 
on an unrelated good—say, ball bearings.56 Instead, the cap maker is 
using the logo to accurately refer to the Major League Baseball team, 
the Red Sox, itself.57 Accordingly, there is none of the loss of distinct-
iveness or uniqueness that dilution traditionally protects against.58 
 Moreover, consumers are not purchasing the cap because the logo 
denotes the source of the good.59 When a fan buys a Red Sox hat, it is 
not because he believes the Red Sox are particularly skilled at the art of 
making hats.60 Rather, he is buying the Red Sox logo.61 It is the logo 
itself that has value, which is why the same exact hat would sell for a 
fraction of the price if it did not have the logo on it.62 
 This kind of use of the trademark does not fit neatly into either 
the traditional likelihood of confusion framework or the newer dilution 
framework. Instead, merchandising treats trademarks as a form of 
property that can be bought and sold.63 This is a significant departure 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 493–95. 
54 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995) (“[T]he use of . . . BUICK aspirin, and KO-
DAK pianos would be actionable . . . .”). 
55 See id.; see also Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.2d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 
2002) (discussing the harm that comes from dilution). 
56 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 494. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. (“Merchandising uses do not blur the distinctive significance of a mark in the 
mind of consumers. Rather, they reinforce it.”). 
59 See id. at 472. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. (“Rather than indicating something to the consumer about the source or 
sponsorship of a product, the mark is the product—or at least is a critical part of what 
makes the product attractive.”). 
62 See Denicola, supra note 50, at 604. 
63 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 471–72. 
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from the traditional role of trademark as an identifier of the source of 
the good or service.64 
 As scholars Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley have pointed out, exist-
ing case law provides surprisingly weak support for this kind of properti-
zation of trademarks.65 Despite the fact that sports teams and leagues 
act as if they have an absolute right to prevent all kinds of merchandis-
ing, very few cases have addressed this issue, and those that have tend to 
point in different directions.66 Indeed, although existing law provides 
teams and leagues with strong protections against uses that are likely to 
confuse, there is relatively little support for a strong claim of absolute 
privilege.67 
B. Rights of Publicity 
 The right of publicity claims advanced by teams and players also 
rest on shaky theoretical foundations. In these cases, the doctrinal sup-
port for the right of publicity claims is relatively strong, at least in those 
states that recognize such a right.68 As many scholars have pointed out, 
however, the right of publicity—although perhaps intuitively appeal-
ing—is in many cases hard to justify with respect to intellectual prop-
erty policy.69 
 Traditionally, the strongest arguments in favor of intellectual 
property have been incentive-based arguments. We protect copyrights 
in order to provide incentives for creative expression.70 We protect pat-
ents in order to provide incentives for innovation.71 It is difficult, how-
ever, to see what incentives are preserved by protecting the right of 
                                                                                                                      
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 475–76 (noting the questionable doctrinal basis for broad merchandising 
rights). 
66 See, e.g., Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (criticizing Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, 
Inc. as extending protection to trademark owners too far); Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. 
Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975) (determining confusion to 
exist wherever trademark is “the triggering mechanism” of sale, regardless of whether the 
consumer was confused as to the source of the trademark). 
67 See Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919. 
68 See Madow, supra note 43, at 132–34. This Article uses the term “right of publicity” to 
refer to the right to “control the use of one’s own name, picture, or likeness and to prevent 
another from using it for commercial benefit without one’s consent.” Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 1439 (9th ed. 2009). 
69 See id. at 178–238; see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (addressing and dismissing many 
arguments in support of the right of publicity in the context of professional sports). 
70 See Madow, supra note 43, at 206. 
71 See id. 
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publicity. Celebrities and athletes already have strong incentives to be-
come famous or to work hard to win.72 It is hard to imagine that, in the 
absence of a right of publicity, celebrities and athletes would stop trying 
so hard or that we would suffer a terrible lack of famous people.73 
 Somewhat stronger arguments for protecting the right of publicity 
are based on rewarding labor. The idea is that we give celebrities and 
athletes a right of publicity as a reward for their hard work.74 This intui-
tive idea underlies a lot of intellectual property law, and has particular 
appeal in the context of the right of publicity.75 At the same time, it is 
difficult to determine just how much reward someone should be enti-
tled to.76 How much of the fame is due to the celebrity’s labor and how 
much of it is due to other factors?77 For example, might the public have 
some claim to the celebrity’s fame? Why is Paris Hilton famous? Why is 
Tom Brady famous? In part, no doubt, it is due to their own hard work. 
But the value of their celebrity is also due, in no small part, to the con-
tributions of the public and the attention the public pays to them. 
Without this attention, there would be no celebrity to speak of.78 
 Finally, some arguments in support of the right of publicity sound 
in personal integrity or privacy.79 One’s name and image are particu-
                                                                                                                      
 
72 See C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 824 (“[M]ajor league baseball players are re-
warded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional 
large sums from endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”); Madow, supra note 43, at 
209 (“[T]he particular activities in our society that generate commercially marketable 
fame are themselves, again with isolated exceptions, very handsomely compensated.”). 
73 See C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 824; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, What the 
Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1187–88 (2006); 
Madow, supra note 43, at 210 (“[E]ven without the right of publicity the rate of return to 
stardom in the entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a 
more than ‘adequate’ supply of creative effort and achievement.”). 
74 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1181; Madow, supra note 43, at 182. 
75 See Madow, supra note 43, at 182–83 (“Judicial opinions generally treat commercially 
valuable fame as a crown of individual achievement . . . . Law review writers, too, generally 
see a commercially valuable public image as something a star attains largely on her own, 
through some combination of talent, effort, intelligence, pluck, and grit.”). 
76 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1181. 
77 See id. (“Others—writers who craft the celebrity’s dramatic roles, agents who pluck 
her from obscurity, studios and marketing directors who shape her public image, even 
devotees who fan the flames of her popularity—play a role in creating the value of a celeb-
rity.”); Madow, supra note 43, at 191 (“The work of ‘fashioning the star out of the raw ma-
terial of the person’ is done not only by the star herself, but by an army of specialists—
consultants, mentors, coaches, advisors, agents, photographers, and publicists.”). 
78 See Madow, supra note 43, at 188–96. 
79 See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 
Duke L.J. 383, 422 (2000) (“[A] philosophical orientation permits us to reconceive the 
right of publicity as a freedom-based property right with both moral and economic charac-
teristics . . . .”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, 
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larly important aspects of one’s identity. Thus, seeing one’s name or 
image plastered on billboards selling cars may work a harm that is akin 
to violating a personal or privacy interest.80 Yet this interest, too, finds 
little support when applied to public figures like celebrities. Quite of-
ten, celebrities have injected themselves into the public sphere, benefit-
ing financially from their fame. Having injected themselves into the 
public sphere, perhaps they are entitled to less of an expectation of pri-
vacy.81 Thus, many reasons exist to be somewhat skeptical of the right 
of publicity.82 
                                                                                                                     
III. The Even Weaker Justifications for Licensing  
Rights in Sports 
 In addition to the general critique of broad licensing rights noted 
above,83 there are even more reasons to be suspicious of such rights in 
the context of sports. In particular, the law does not adequately take 
account of the interests of sports fans and their highly interactive and 
personal relationship to the leagues and teams that they support.84 
A. Fan Interests in Copyright 
 In recent years, intellectual property scholars have paid increasing 
attention to the interests of consumers and fans.85 In particular, copy-
right scholars have begun to analyze consumer interests more expressly, 
noting the ways in which such interests do or do not find support in the 
 
and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 (2009) (“Bloustein posited that com-
mercial uses of a person’s name or photograph are actionable because of the injury caused 
‘to the sense of personal dignity’ by diminishing that individual’s freedom.”). 
80 See Madow, supra note 43, at 168. 
81 See id. at 168–69. 
82 See supra notes 68–81 and accompanying text. 
83 See supra notes 44–82 and accompanying text. 
84 See infra notes 109–129 and accompanying text. 
85 See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 
347 (2005) (discussing absence of user interests in forming copyright doctrine); Jessica 
Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871 (2007) (analyzing the role of readers, 
listeners, viewers, and the general public in copyright’s personal use doctrine); Joseph P. 
Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 397 (2003) (examining interests 
of consumers in copyright law); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a 
New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 651 (1997) (arguing for legal protection for sec-
ondary creativity expressed in noncommercial fan fiction). 
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law.86 This has been, to some extent, a reaction to new technologies, 
which enable ever greater consumer interaction with copyrighted works.87 
 Take, for example, the case of fan fiction. Fan fiction is fiction writ-
ten by fans of popular television shows or movies, such as Star Trek or 
Star Wars.88 Fan fiction authors make use of the characters, events, and 
worlds of the original shows to write their own episodes, which they then 
post on the Internet.89 Consumers of fan fiction download these epi-
sodes, read them, and quite often critique them. Rather robust commu-
nities can arise surrounding copyrighted works through the medium of 
fan fiction.90 
 Fan fiction represents an interesting new challenge for traditional 
copyright doctrines, which generally assume a more passive audience.91 
These fans are not competitors of the original copyright owners in any 
traditional sense, nor are they a passive audience—they are something 
in between.92 Copyright owners have, in many cases, been tolerant of 
these efforts as long as they do not present an economic threat.93 It is 
not at all clear, however, how such efforts should be analyzed under 
copyright law. Are these derivative works?94 And, if so, do they qualify 
for fair use?95 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Cohen, supra note 85, at 249–73; Liu, supra note 85, at 401–20; Tushnet, supra 
note 85, at 664–83. 
87 Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy 1–19 (2008). 
88 See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 655 (“‘Fan fiction,’ broadly speaking, is any kind of 
written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular culture, such as a 
television show, and is not produced as ‘professional’ writing.”). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 664 (“Case law does not address fair use in the context of fan fiction or any-
thing reasonably similar to it . . . . Copyright law in general has very little to say to non-
commercial and noninstitutional actors because until very recently their activities have 
gone unnoticed.”). 
92 See id. at 660 (arguing that fan fiction resembles “a musical composition inspired by 
a novel” (internal citations omitted)). 
93 Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 617, 619, 633–34 (2008) (“There may 
be a variety of reasons for tolerating use. Reasons can include . . . enforcement costs . . . or 
a calculation that the infringement creates an economic complement to the copyrighted 
work—it actually benefits the owner.”). 
94 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the ex-
clusive rights to do and to authorize . . . derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work.”). 
95 See id. § 107 (listing factors to be considered when determining if use of a copy-
righted work is authorized as fair use); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 571–72 (1994) (analyzing whether a commercial parody of a song could be consid-
ered fair use). 
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 Similarly, fan websites often make extensive use of copyrighted and 
trademarked material.96 The many Star Wars and Star Trek fan websites 
often incorporate pictures, text, and descriptions of episodes, among 
other things, from the original copyrighted works.97 One recent case 
involved a website devoted to the Harry Potter universe.98 An individual 
created a website called “The Harry Potter Lexicon,” which was essen-
tially an encyclopedia that defined terms, characters, spells, and events 
from the Harry Potter books.99 Fans of the books wrote the entries, pri-
marily drawing from the Harry Potter books, companion books and news-
letters, published interviews of the author, and other outside reference 
sources.100 J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry Potter books, initially 
supported this effort.101 When the owner of the website decided to turn 
it into a published book, however, Rowling sued, alleging copyright in-
fringement.102 Rowling won her lawsuit,103 but the author of the website 
was later able to publish the book after removing a number of passages 
copied from the original books and rewriting the book to include sub-
stantial original commentary.104 
 These cases generally fit within a larger trend of increasing audi-
ence and consumer engagement with copyrighted and trademarked 
works.105 Digital technology now enables audience members to manipu-
late these works with ever greater sophistication and to share the results 
with the world. Copyright law’s response to these developments is still in 
its infancy. Some have argued that copyright’s fair use doctrine must be 
interpreted more expansively, to take into account these new opportuni-
                                                                                                                      
96 Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 
1129, 1139–49 (2001). 
97 See, e.g., The Federation: “Keeping the Dream Alive!”, http://www.trekfederation. 
com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011); Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia. 
com/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). 
98 See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
99 See id. at 520. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 521. 
102 See id. at 523–24. 
103 See id. at 554 (“Plaintiffs have established copyright infringement . . . . Defendant 
has failed to establish its affirmative defense of fair use. Defendant’s publication of the 
Lexicon is hereby permanently enjoined, and Plaintiffs are awarded statutory damages 
. . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
104 See Emilia Askari, Potter Guide Reaches Stores: Author Sued by J.K. Rowling Says Issue Is 
over Now, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 15, 2009, at 2. The rewritten book is called, The Lexi-
con: An Unauthorized Guide to Harry Potter Fiction and Related Material. Id. 
105 See Lessig, supra note 87, at 1–19. 
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ties for uses of existing works.106 Unsurprisingly, copyright owners do 
not appear to agree.107 
 My own view is that the increasingly interactive nature of copy-
righted and trademarked works means that courts should give more 
leeway to these uses, particularly in cases where there is little economic 
threat to an existing market. Such uses represent a trend that is worth 
encouraging as it gives the audience a way to interact with works in a 
much less passive manner.108 
B. Application of Fan Interests in Sports 
 Many of these developments in copyright apply with particular 
force in the realm of sports. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a stronger 
example of fan participation than in sports. There may be many indi-
viduals devoted to the Harry Potter books, but fans of Harry Potter do not 
generally gather in large groups around the country every weekend, or 
watch Harry Potter events on television in the tens of millions every 
week, or spend countless hours debating Harry Potter on talk radio.109 
Indeed, few things approach the dedication and intensity of interaction 
expressed by even the average sports fan. 
 At the risk of over-intellectualizing the sports fan, sports teams play 
an important role in the daily lives of many individuals. Individuals often 
derive great personal value from affiliating themselves with a particular 
team, joining with others in a common and well-defined goal, and dis-
cussing the tribulations of the local team.110 Sometimes these affiliations 
are regional; sometimes they cross regions. Wearing a team logo may 
communicate a whole host of things about the wearer. Indeed, it is 
probably not an exaggeration to say that sports fandom plays an impor-
tant role in the formation and personhood of many individuals.111 
 It is thus somewhat surprising that merchandising and right-of-
publicity law currently gives such little recognition to the interests of 
                                                                                                                      
106 See, e.g., id. 
107 See, e.g., Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
108 See generally Liu, supra note 85. 
109 See Pearlman, supra note 4; 10/1: Majority of U.S. Residents College Football Fans, supra 
note 4. 
110 See For Love or Money: The Unrequited Passion of the Sports Fan, Knowledge @ W.P. Carey 
( Jan. 3, 2007), http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1353 (“Sports ob-
session . . . is not about rationality; it’s about raw association.” (internal citations omitted)). 
111 See, e.g., Nick Hornby, Fever Pitch 11 (1998) (“It has become quite clear to me 
that my devotion says things about my own character and personal history . . . .”); Bill 
Simmons, Now I Can Die in Peace 7 (2009) (“I can’t remember a single day of my life 
that didn’t involve the Boston teams.”). 
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fans. Indeed, sports franchises and leagues have become ever more ag-
gressive in their policing and protection of their trademarks and rights 
of publicity, and the law has largely abetted this expansion112 without 
paying much attention to the impact on fans. 
 As noted above, it is not at all clear that this expansion in the intel-
lectual property rights of sports teams benefits fans in any concrete 
way.113 Sports fans would probably be better off if there were meaning-
ful competition in the market for sports merchandise. They would be 
able to purchase such merchandise at a far lower price and choose 
from a far wider range of products.114 They would find it much easier 
to identify themselves with their teams. Moreover, it is hard to imagine 
that the sports teams themselves would now have less incentive either to 
sell their own officially licensed merchandise or, more generally, to in-
vest in the quality of their teams.115 
 Similarly, an expansive right of publicity enriches athletes at the 
expense of the fans without any persuasive justification. By enforcing 
strong rights of publicity, courts essentially raise the price of goods that 
contain the athlete’s image, whether such goods are trading cards, 
posters, video games, or the like. This essentially takes funds away from 
fans and shifts them to the athletes, and for what reason? It is, once 
again, hard to imagine that teams or sports figures would not try as 
hard to win if they did not have this stream of compensation.116 
 And, just as in the case of copyrighted works, new technologies are 
making it possible for sports fans to interact more with their favorite 
teams.117 Even before such technologies existed, fans appropriated 
team trademarks by dressing up at games, painting faces, and creating 
signs. Today, sports fan websites can play many of the same roles that 
fan fiction websites and the like play with respect to copyrighted 
works.118 Such sports fan websites may often display copyrighted photos 
                                                                                                                      
112 See e.g., Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 75 
(5th Cir. 1979); NBA v. Design Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
113 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 481–84; see also supra notes 49–51 and ac-
companying text. 
114 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 481; see also supra notes 49–51 and accompa-
nying text. 
115 See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1187–88; Madow, 
supra note 43, at 210. 
116 See Madow, supra note 43, at 210. 
117 See, e.g., Beller, supra note 23 (noting how the rise of the Internet has helped in-
crease the popularity of fantasy sports). 
118 See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
2011] Sports Fans, Sports Merchandising, and the Right of Publicity 509 
or trademarked logos.119 As mentioned above, fantasy sports leagues 
allow fans to participate more actively in the ups and downs of various 
teams and players.120 Finally, video games allow fans to interact even 
more directly with their teams and favorite players.121 
 Given both the intensity of the fan interaction and the opportuni-
ties provided by new technology, the question becomes: how should the 
law respond? To begin with, the fact that fans have an intense and active 
relationship with their teams does not mean that the teams’ intellectual 
property rights are not entitled to protection. Teams should still have 
strong rights to prevent uses that are confusing or diluting. Indeed, fans 
and teams may have a collective interest in maintaining the distinctive-
ness of a team’s logo or color scheme. If competitors were able to dilute 
the distinctiveness of, for example, the Oakland Raiders’ black and sil-
ver uniforms and logo by selling pink and green versions, fans may col-
lectively experience this as a loss because it would undercut their ability 
to identify with their team.122 Thus, teams should still have strong rights 
to protect their interests against confusing and diluting uses.123 
 At the same time, courts should more expressly recognize a greater 
degree of freedom of uses by fans and by companies that support these 
uses. Thus, for example, fan websites should have broad privileges to use 
team logos, colors, and trademarks to identify their teams. Currently, 
many teams do in fact permit such uses.124 To the extent this happens, 
however, it is a matter of tolerance, not of an established right.125 
 In addition, more interactive fan uses should be privileged. The 
fantasy sports cases highlight the importance of holding the line on this 
front and ensuring that fans have broad ability to interact with their 
teams.126 The results of games and the statistics generated by those 
games should not be the exclusive property of the teams or leagues. 
Instead, they should belong to the public at large. Note that this con-
                                                                                                                      
119 See, e.g., Over the Monster, http://www.overthemonster.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2011). 
120 See Beller, supra note 23; Fantasy Sports Participation on the Rise, supra note 25. 
121 See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 8, 2010) (“[C]onsumers can simulate football matches between college and university 
teams.”); see also supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
122 See generally Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience In-
terests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923 (1999). 
123 See supra notes 44–64 and accompanying text. 
124 See Wu, supra note 93, at 619. 
125 See id. 
126 See C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 823 (baseball statistics are protected by First 
Amendment); CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 
398, 417–19 (D. Minn. 2009) (football statistics are protected by First Amendment). 
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cern about fans should extend not only to the fans themselves, but to 
companies that serve the fans.127 So, for example, companies that set 
up fantasy sports leagues should be permitted to use the statistics, iden-
tities, and names of the teams and players. The operative question 
should not merely be how to apportion the value between the league 
and the company; it should ultimately be about the impact on the fans. 
 Similarly, the issue of using real teams, players, and statistics in vid-
eo games should be decided with greater attention to the impact on 
fans. Fans have a great interest in playing video games that make use of 
actual teams and players. Allowing competition in the market for such 
video games would benefit fans by giving them more choices. At the 
same time, it is hard to argue that the leagues and teams would have 
any less incentive to put out a good product even if they could not ex-
clusively license the rights to video games.128 The teams might have a 
good claim if the video game manufacturers misled consumers into 
thinking that the games were authorized by the teams, or if the manu-
facturers diluted the distinctive character of the marks.129 There would 
be no broad entitlement, however, to prevent the use of these marks in 
video games or websites. 
C. Case Studies: Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and O’Bannon v. NCAA 
 At least one of the video game cases currently in litigation presents 
the issue of fan involvement quite directly. In early 2010, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California heard Keller v. Elec-
tronic Arts, Inc.130 In that case, a former college football player, Samuel 
Keller, sued Electronic Arts, alleging that its video game, NCAA Football, 
violated his right of publicity.131 Interestingly, NCAA Football did not use 
the actual names of the players.132 It allegedly did, however, endow vid-
eo game players on a certain team with the same numbers, physical 
                                                                                                                      
127 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution, 505 F.3d at 820 (granting a declaratory judgment that al-
lowed a company providing fans with fantasy sports products to use the names and statis-
tics of professional baseball players in connection with its fantasy baseball products). 
128 See id. at 824; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1187–88; Madow, supra note 43, at 
210. 
129 See supra notes 44–64 and accompanying text. 
130 2010 WL 530108. 
131 See id. at *2. For a discussion of related issues, see generally Ciafrone & Baker, supra 
note 32; Dennie, supra note 32. 
132 See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1. 
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characteristics, and statistics as the real players on that team.133 More-
over, because the video game allowed users to change the fictional 
names, and several websites allowed purchasers to upload entire team 
rosters, users could, without much difficulty, replace the fictional 
names with the real names that they allegedly corresponded to.134 
 In a similar case that has since been consolidated with Keller, a 
former UCLA basketball player, Ed O’Bannon, filed suit on behalf of 
himself and other former NCAA players against the NCAA and its li-
censing arm, alleging antitrust violations related to the improper ap-
propriation of their rights of publicity.135 Specifically, O’Bannon ob-
jected to the use of his image and likeness on various promotional 
materials, such as DVDs and video games.136 
 The consolidated Keller-O’Bannon litigation presents many interest-
ing issues that are unrelated to the intellectual property rights of the 
players and leagues. Much of the commentary on this litigation centers 
on the relationship between NCAA players and the NCAA as an organi-
zation, analyzing whether the players legitimately licensed away their 
publicity rights or whether the NCAA can validly license them to third 
parties for commercial purposes, among other issues.137 Most of the 
debate over the intellectual property rights centers on whether they 
belong most properly with the league or the players.138 
 Missing from this discussion is a broader recognition of the impor-
tance of the interests of fans of NCAA sports. Cases like Keller highlight 
the many new ways in which fans are more actively engaging with the 
teams that they support. Not only do the video games give individuals 
the ability to become participants in the games, but they also give them 
the chance to adjust and adapt the names of the players—and in some 
                                                                                                                      
133 See id. (noting the allegation that Electronic Arts “sends questionnaires to team 
equipment managers of college football teams” in order “[t]o enhance the accuracy of the 
player depictions”). 
134 See id. 
135 See O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882, 2010 WL 
445190, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). The Keller and O’Bannon cases were consolidated 
by order of Judge Claudia Wilken on January 15, 2010 into In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Litigation. See No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 5644656, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 
2010) (denying certain plaintiffs’ motion to deconsolidate and referencing the January 15, 
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136 See id. at *3 (“These alleged agreements are for licenses to distribute products or 
media containing the images of O’Bannon and other former student athletes.”). 
137 See, e.g., Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 5, at 271–74; Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA 
Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video Game Industry, Ent. & Sports 
Law., Summer 2009, at 1, 25–26. 
138 See, e.g., O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *1; Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 5, at 243. 
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cases incorporate the names and statistics of real players. This kind of 
participatory involvement is something new and something that should 
be given wide latitude.139 
 Once fan interests are taken into account, it becomes more diffi-
cult to understand why either the NCAA or the players should have the 
exclusive ability to control the right to make NCAA video games. In-
deed, perhaps the best result, at least for fans, would be for neither par-
ty to have this right. For example, if the rights were given back to the 
individual players, this could make it even more difficult for video 
game companies to license the rights from hundreds of NCAA players. 
At the very least, the interest of the fans is a factor that needs to be tak-
en into account through some changes in the scope of these intellec-
tual property rights, discussed in the next Part. These changes would 
give some acknowledgement, heretofore missing, to the importance of 
the fan interest and the contributions that fans make to the success of a 
team or a league.140 
IV. Accounting for the Interests of Sports Fans 
 Both the weak legal foundations of aggressive licensing and the 
increased importance of fan interests suggest a more limited and con-
strained legal framework for sports licensing.141 This Part highlights a 
few changes that would respond to these observations.142 
A. Narrow Merchandising Right 
 The merchandising right in the realm of sports should be far more 
limited than it currently is, with greater leeway given to fans for using 
and transforming trademarks in creative ways.143 First, trademark pro-
tection for sports logos should be carefully limited to protect against 
uses that are likely to cause confusion or likely to dilute the distinctive 
character of the mark. The protection against confusing uses is the 
core, traditional trademark interest.144 For example, someone selling 
unauthorized Red Sox caps would be liable under traditional trade-
                                                                                                                      
139 See Lessig, supra note 87, at 1–19; Tushnet, supra note 85, at 664; Beller, supra note 
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140 See DeSarbo, supra note 3; supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 42–140 and accompanying text. 
142 See infra notes 143–161 and accompanying text. 
143 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 481–84 (making this argument in the context 
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144 See Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 170 
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mark principles if he were misleading buyers into thinking that the 
caps were authorized.145 If that individual clearly indicated that the 
caps were unauthorized, however, there would be no liability for likeli-
hood of confusion.146 
ark. 
                                                                                                                     
 Under the above example, the Red Sox might still be able to bring 
a claim for dilution.147 The scope of that claim should be significantly 
limited, however, with an eye toward fan interests. The main question 
under a limited dilution claim would be whether the use dilutes the 
distinctive character of the mark.148 For example, if the vendor were 
selling caps that used significantly different colors, the Red Sox might 
have a claim if they could show that this would make the mark less dis-
tinctive. In some cases, there would be no impact. If the use were to 
become widespread enough to weaken the distinctive colors and logo, 
however, there would be a dilution claim.149 Protection against this 
kind of dilution not only benefits the Red Sox, but also the fans, who 
have an interest in the distinctive character of the m
 In neither case, however, would there be broad property rights 
over the logo or trademarks. Third parties could generally use team 
logos, as long as there were no likelihood of confusion or dilution of 
the distinctive characteristics of the mark. This would enable a wide 
range of creative uses of marks by third parties, including fans. Thus, 
for example, in University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art 
Inc.,150 the 2009 case from the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama discussed above,151 the University of Alabama would 
have no ability to stop the artist from painting famous scenes from 
Crimson Tide history because there would be neither risk of confusion 
nor dilution. A more limited right would also allow companies to use 
team logos in fantasy sports websites, fan websites, and video games— 
again, as long as there were no likelihood of confusion or dilution.152 
 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 173 (finding no likelihood of confusion); see also supra notes 47–48 and ac-
companying text. 
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (federal dilution statute). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. In reality, such a claim by the Red Sox seems unlikely given the fact that the 
team itself sells caps that deviate substantially from the traditional Red Sox design. See, e.g., 
Boston Red Sox St. Patrick’s Day Argyle Cleanup Cap, Red Sox-MLB.com Shop, http://shop. 
mlb.com/product/index.jsp?productId=3892637 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
150 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
151 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra notes 44–62 and accompanying text. 
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 To reinforce this privilege, courts should expressly acknowledge the 
communicative and associative functions that these uses serve. These 
productive uses of trademarks are quite distinct from traditional uses of 
trademarks. The fan website uses the Red Sox logo, not as a marker of 
its own website services, but to accurately identify the Red Sox and to 
communicate effectively about the Red Sox. The video game uses the 
Red Sox logo, not to identify the source of the video game, but to accu-
rately depict the Red Sox. Current trademark doctrine recognizes this 
kind of an interest through the nominative use doctrine, which permits 
third parties to use trademarks if there is no easy alternative to accu-
rately identify a particular group or entity.153 
 The nominative use doctrine should be interpreted more broadly 
in the context of sports. Sports teams are particularly susceptible to the 
nominative use problem.154 The phrase “the major league baseball 
team located in Boston” is a very poor substitute for “the Boston Red 
Sox.”155 In the context of sports, the nominative use doctrine should be 
expanded beyond the words to include the logo and other aspects of 
trade dress, where necessary. Just as the term “Red Sox” is necessary to 
accurately describe the team in print, the logo and trade dress are nec-
essary to communicate about the team in a visual manner, say on a 
website or in a video game. This reflects an acknowledgement that we 
are no longer limited to describing these teams in print but now have 
many more tools to interact and engage with the teams that we support. 
B. Narrow Publicity Rights 
 Similarly, publicity rights should be narrowed to recognize fan in-
terests. Athletes should still have rights to control endorsements. En-
dorsements, which are linked to an athlete’s success and provide a lu-
crative source of compensation, may motivate some athletes to work 
harder. Moreover, false or misleading endorsements may confuse con-
sumers (though this could be addressed through disclaimers).156 Fi-
                                                                                                                      
153 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306–08 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
154 See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Is Nominal Use an Answer to the Free Speech and 
Right of Publicity Quandary?: Lessons from America’s National Pastime, 11 Chap. L. Rev. 435 
(2008) (suggesting such an approach with respect to the right of publicity). 
155 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306 (“[O]ne might refer to ‘the two-time world 
champions’ or ‘the professional basketball team from Chicago,’ but it is far simpler (and 
more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls.”). 
156 See Madow, supra note 43, at 229. 
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nally, athletes might object to being associated with certain products or 
services.157 Thus, this core right would still be important. 
 Such rights should not extend, however, to all commercially valu-
able uses of an athlete’s image or name. For example, uses of an ath-
lete’s name or image in a video game should fall outside the scope of 
the athlete’s—or league’s or union’s—control. The video game com-
pany is not using the athlete’s name or image in the traditional way that 
gives rise to a publicity claim. The presence of an athlete’s name or 
identity in a video game is not an endorsement of that game. Rather, 
the game is trying to accurately depict a certain sports league. It is a 
communicative use—an attempt to depict reality. In that sense, it is 
more akin to a painting of a sports figure at an important event,158 or 
the description of what a player did in a particular game. True, it is not 
exactly the same. The video game company is making money from the 
use of the image, and the use is certainly more commercial. Perhaps it 
is more accurate to say that this kind of use falls uneasily between the 
traditional endorsement and a purely communicative use. 
 In such a case, however, where the use is in between, the interests of 
sports fans are relevant and should tilt the balance. When fan interests 
are considered, it is clear that such uses should be privileged.159 Fans 
have a strong interest in video games that accurately depict sports teams. 
One reason Madden NFL is so popular is because it licensed the exclusive 
rights to the team names, logos, and players.160 Although such an ar-
rangement certainly benefits the league and the players, are fans better 
off? Or would they be better off if there were meaningful competition in 
the market for video games? What if there were many football video 
games that all made use of the team logos and players? Games could 
then compete on price and features, such as game play. Ultimately, fans 
would benefit from a greater range of choices at lower cost.161 
Conclusion 
 In the end, many of these changes would have the effect of reduc-
ing the compensation that the teams, leagues, players, and universities 
would get. They would no longer be able to get the full amount of li-
                                                                                                                      
157 See id. at 229–31. 
158 See e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918–19 (6th Cir. 2003) (law-
suit involving paintings of famous figures in sports and famous sporting events). 
159 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 481–84; see also supra notes 113–129 and ac-
companying text. 
160 See Rovell, supra note 31. 
161 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 43, at 481. 
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censing revenues from uses such as video games, fantasy sports leagues, 
and the like. But intellectual property policy is not structured around 
compensating the teams, leagues, and players at all costs. It protects 
intellectual property in order to benefit society more generally. This 
Article has argued that, in the area of sports licensing, we need to shift 
away from a concern about compensating the leagues and players, and 
toward a view that asks what is ultimately best for the fans. 
